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This paper proposes a two tier RBAC approach for secure and selective information sharing among virtual
multi-agency response team (VMART) and allows expansion of the VMART by admitting new collabora-
tors (government agencies or NGOs) as need arise. A coordinator Web Service for each member agency is
proposed.The coordinator Web Service is responsible for authentication, information dissemination, infor-
mation acquisition, role creation and enforcement of predeﬁned access control policies. Secure, selective and
ﬁne-grained information sharing is realized through the encryption of XML documents according to RBAC
policies deﬁned for the corresponding XML schema.
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1 Introduction
In the context of homeland security, one of the key challenges is achieving eﬀective,
timely and systematic collaboration and information sharing among various gov-
ernment agencies at the Federal, state, and local levels. Given the sensitive nature
of the information, it is critical that information sharing be based on relevance and
security. A majority of the agencies are using the Web as a means for sharing re-
lated information, that exists in diﬀerent forms, and increasingly utilizing XML to
represent this information. In case of a crisis, a virtual response team needs to be
formed in an ad-hoc manner. Members of this virtual response team come from var-
ious government agencies and private organizations. Depending on several factors,
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including the location and nature of the crisis, the composition of this virtual multi-
agency response team may change from one crisis to another. Furthermore, during
the course of a given crisis the membership of this virtual multi-agency response
team (VMART) may change dynamically to accommodate various needs (e.g., pub-
lic health versus ﬁre) and to conform to certain constraints, such as jurisdictions,
e.g., the crisis extends, initially from New York to New Jersey.
Members of the VMART are both information providers and consumers. As
an information provider, an agency will send information, e.g., situation report, to
the rest of the team as soon as it is created. As this information is ”pushed” to
the various agencies, there is a need to be concerned about access to this sensitive
information both at the agency level (inter-agency) as well as within a given agency
(intra-agency).
At the inter-agency level, each agency that is member of the VMART fulﬁls a
certain role and, accordingly, gains access to certain information that is necessary
to discharge its duties and fulﬁll its responsibilities within the overall eﬀorts. For
example, the public health agency would need to have access only to information
related to public health, whereas FBI may need access to other related information
that is diﬀerent from the information needed by the public health agency. Due to
the dynamic nature of the environment, a situation may arise where there is a need
to admit an agency, that was not a part of the overall predeﬁned set of agencies, as a
member of the VMART. For example, as a certain crisis evolves, the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) might ﬁnd it necessary to include the State Department
as a member of the current VMART. In this case, DHS should be able to assign
the State Department an appropriate role together with matching permissions that
enable the State Department to fulﬁll its function in the overall eﬀorts. Clearly, in
this case, the DHS can not grant permissions, to the State Department, that they
themselves do not own. At the intra-agency level, each of the agencies, that make up
the VMART, has its own complex security policy. In addition, within each of these
agencies there are individuals who perform a certain role (e.g., chief, ﬁrst responder),
possess diﬀerent credentials and have diﬀerent levels of access permissions that
match their duties and their roles within the agency. Adherence and enforcement of
these distributed policies that determine, who can access what information and at
what level of granularity?, (e.g., the entire situation report, or only the part of the
report that pertains to public health) are essential in order to ensure eﬀective inter-
agency and inter-governmental response. Our problem can be stated as follows.
Given the environment described above, there is a need to provide each member
of the VMART with automated capability to distribute to other members of the
VMART only those portions of the generated information that are deemed relevant.
In this paper we will limit our focus to information represented as an XML document
with an underlying schema.The paper is organized as follows; section 2 discusses
a motivating scenario. Section 3 provides our approach. In section 4, we detail
the system architecture. Section 5 discusses related work. Section 6 includes our
conclusion and future work.
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Table 1
Agencies, responsibilities and situation reports
2 Motivating Example
As a motivating example, consider a scenario where there several explosions in
various parts of New York and assume that the following agencies constitute the
initial VMART.
(1) JIC (Joint Information Center), (2) FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation), (3)
HHS (Health & Human Services), (4) NYPD (New York Police Department), (5)
NYFD (New York Fire Department ), (6) NYDOT (New York Department of Trans-
portation), (7) FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency), and (8) PANYNJ
(Port Authority of New York and New Jersey)
Based on its responsibilities, a given agency may generate a set of situation
reports. Table 1 lists the diﬀerent types of situation reports shared among diﬀerent
agencies. Once a situation report is generated by a given agency, certain portions
of the report need to be shared with various members of the team. Based on its
responsibilities, a given agency may generate a set of situation reports. Table 1
shows examples of such situation reports. Once a situation report is generated,
certain portions of the report is shared with members of the team.
3 Proposed Approach
Our approach builds on SOA that facilitates eﬀective assimilation, and sharing of
information that is vital for homeland security wherein it is important for agen-
cies to communicate in a decentralized environment. The identiﬁcation of proper
tasks and agencies that can accomplish the tasks is followed by the dynamic dis-
covery of resources and applications needed for achieving these tasks utilizing the
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Fig. 1. Proposed service oriented framework in the VMART environment
SOA. Putting the information and tasks together manually jeopardizes the timely
response to a crisis. SOA provides an automated way to identify and compose tasks
and to disseminate relevant information to be executed by diﬀerent team members.
Our approach proposes sharing information and data in the VMART environment
using push or pull mechanisms. In the following sections, we explain the proposed
solution for secure dissemination of information contents using the push mechanism.
We begin detailing our approach with a discussion on SOA in section 3.1. For se-
cure and selective dissemination of information, we assume that the information
can be represented as XML document for which ﬁne-grain access control can be
speciﬁed. The authorizations for the XML documents are speciﬁed using the role
based access control (RBAC) model. Due to the autonomous nature of the collabo-
rating agencies and their diverse organizational structure, we consider two levels of
information sharing: 1) at the inter-agency level - to members of the VMART, by
the site coordinator Web service of the owner agency; 2) at the intra-agency level -
to authorized users within a given agency, by the site coordinator Web service of the
receiving agency. The site coordinator Web service is described in section 3.2. This
information sharing takes place according to the predeﬁned policies already in place
and is enforced by the agency’s coordinator Web service. Each role at inter-agency
level or intra-agency level has diﬀerent authorizations over the information contents
organized as XML document. Each role is assigned a separate key which is used
to decrypt the portion of XML documents for which the role has valid authoriza-
tion. The details of role permission assignment and XML document encryption are
described in sections 3.5 and 3.6, respectively.
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3.1 SOA
Our approach adopts Web Services to achieve complex tasks to automate the dis-
covery of the necessary information services (tasks) and compose these services for
a particular incident in a crisis situation in accordance with the national, regional
or local agency protocols (policies). Speciﬁcally each agency has its own set of
localized Web services. These localized services provide agency speciﬁc function-
alities. Each agency site coordinator Web service selects and composes a set of
services based on the functionality required for responding to a particular incident
in a crisis. These services provide the agency speciﬁc output required as part of the
response. The outputs from the set of services are then summarized in an XML
document as information forming the situation report. The agency site coordinator
Web service then selectively disseminates this information to all the members of
the VMART based on their roles,e.g., the NYDOT invokes its traﬃcStatus Web
service to gather the traﬃc reports for the aﬀected area. The output of this Web
service is the situation report as reported by NYDOT. The NYDOT Web service
then disseminates this situation report to other members of the VMART. Figure 1,
shows the proposed framework based on SOA and details the steps involved in the
selection of the relevant Web service and the creation of the situation report. In this
framework, the diﬀerent agencies and organizations that participate in the VMART
activities, specify the services they oﬀer, policy statement that govern their use, and
the information/data they need from the VMART members to perform the desig-
nated task. This speciﬁcation is stored in a service directory that is localized to
individual VMART member. The framework utilizes service ontologies for semantic
classiﬁcation of services oﬀered by the service providers. Depending on the crisis
situation and the current contextual conditions such as the proximity of the service
provider to the aﬀected area, the service delivery time, infrastructure availability
at the service provider site, the coordinator service selects the potential services
from the available pool of service providers. After short listing of candidate ser-
vice providers, the policies of all the collaborating agencies and candidate service
providers are analyzed for satisfaction of authorization and policy constraints.
3.2 Site Coordinator Web Service
A key component of the proposed framework of Figure 2 is the site coordinator Web
service. In the following, we discuss the responsibilities of the site coordinator Web
service in the context of VMART expansion
A site coordinator Web service is installed at each VMART member site as shown
in Figure 2. The coordinator Web service performs three major tasks: 1) discovery
and selection of service providers, 2) secure sharing of information to all collaborat-
ing agencies, and 3) role creation for dynamic formation of VMART. These tasks
are achieved using a set of authentication service, information dissemination service,
information acquisition service and a role creation service. The service speciﬁcations
and collaboration requirements are speciﬁed by the VMART agency that needs to
access the services of other agencies to perform the designated tasks. The site co-
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Fig. 2. Responsibilities of coordinator
ordinator Web service has access to the service directory (UDDI), which stores the
speciﬁcations and usage policies of services oﬀered by various collaborating service
providers and organizations willing to participate in the VMART activities. Based
on the current contextual conditions, the service policies, and collaboration require-
ments, the site coordinator Web service utilizes the coordinating service to select
appropriate service providers and control the information ﬂow among them. The
second major responsibility of the site coordinator Web service is secure sharing of
information contents to relevant agencies in a timely manner.
Information sharing takes two diﬀerent forms: information distribution and in-
formation acquisition. At the inter-agency level, information distribution is the
process of pushing relevant portions of the information. The information push
takes place at two levels: 1) at the inter-agency level - to members of the VMART,
by the site coordinator Web service of the owner agency; 2) at the intra-agency level
- to authorized users within a given agency, by the site coordinator Web service of
the receiving agency. This information push takes place according to the predeﬁned
policies already in place and is enforced by an agency’s coordinator Web service
Information acquisition is the process of ”pulling” needed information from other
agencies. Initially, an agency’s coordinator Web service authenticates itself to other
agencies’ coordinators. Once the authentication process is successful, a secure ses-
sion is established where the requester (agency) sends the details of its request. The
coordinator Web service of the owner agency decides whether the requester agency
can pull the information according to predeﬁned access control policies and SLA.
In contrast with information dissemination, information acquisition takes place at
only at inter agency level.
Role creation becomes necessary when an agency joins a VMART through an
existing agency. For example, NYFD may create a new role New Jersey Fire de-
partment (NJFD) in case the NYFD needs the help of NJFD and wants to append
it to the current VMART. This new role is created according to the role creation
policies which are discussed in detail in section 3.5.
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Fig. 3. Agencies, responsibilities and situation reports
Table 2
Nodes of the XML document and agencies that can access these nodes
3.3 XML Document
To support ﬁne-grained access to information in a collaborative environment, we
assume that shared information can be represented as an XML document for which
access control policies can be speciﬁed at the element level(e.g [6,9]). As an example,
Figure 3 depicts a fragment of a ﬁrst response situation report (generated by NYPD
- see Table 1) as an XML tree.
Another important aspect of proposed framework is that due to the sensitivity
and relevance of information with respect to an agencys role, diﬀerent portions of
the XML document are accessible by diﬀerent agencies. Table 2 shows the nodes of
the XML document of ﬁrst response situation report and the corresponding agencies
that can access these nodes.
For example, Injury part of the XML document is accessible by HHS, whereas
Explosion Proﬁle part is accessible by FBI. To achieve having diﬀerent agencies gain
access to diﬀerent portion of an XML document we discuss a document encryption
and key generation scheme in Section 3.6.
3.4 Two-Tier RBAC
The role based access control model (RBAC) [4] seems to be well suited for our envi-
ronment. In RBAC, permissions are associated with roles and users are assigned to
roles based on their respective functions and responsibilities. RBAC, which simpli-
ﬁes management of permissions, is policy-neutral and directly supports important
security principles, e.g., separation of duties, least privilege, and data abstraction.
We propose two tier RBAC: inter-agency level (VMART members); and intra-
agency level. At the inter-agency level, each member of the VMART fulﬁlls a
given role, e.g., NYPD (New York City Police Department), NYFD (New York Fire
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Department), etc. On the other hand, at the intra-agency level, we assume that
roles exist for various functions and users within a given agency are assigned to the
roles based on their qualiﬁcations and responsibilities.
In order to support dynamic collaboration among agencies and allow expansion
of the VMART, by admitting new collaborators (government agencies or NGOs) as
needs arise, we modiﬁed RBAC so that a coordinator Web service can create other
roles. This modiﬁed RBAC model is similar to the self-evolving RBXAC model[6].
At the inter-agency level, an agency coordinator Web service enforces both the role
permission assignment and the role creation for the other collaborating agencies.
On the other hand, at the intra-agency level, an agency coordinator Web service
enforces only role permission assignment for the roles within the agency. For role
permission assignment, Read is the access mode through which roles can access
objects. For role creation, Create is the access mode through which an agency
coordinator Web service can create other roles. Below is the detailed discussion on
the speciﬁcation of role creation and permission assignment privileges.
3.5 RBAC Speciﬁcation for Role Creation and Permission Assignment
In our model, there are two types of privileges that can be exercised by a coordinator
Web service of each agency. These privileges are role permission assignment and role
creation. Role permission assignment speciﬁcation is a tuple (role, permission set)
(rpac) where role is the role to which that permission set is assigned, permission
set is the set of objects that the role can Read, and rpac is the role permission
assignment constraint. Object can be a node, a set of nodes or the entire XML
Schema. Role permission assignment constraints are as follows:
• If a node is added to the permission set of a role and access to that node requires
access to the ancestor of that node, then this ancestor node should also be added
to the permission set.
• If a node is eliminated from the permission set of a role, any child nodes of this
node should also be eliminated from the permission set of that role.
For example,
(NYPD, Read (FirstResponse(Location)))
allows NYPD to read the ”Location” node of ”First Response” report. Role creation
policy is a tuple ((role, access mode) (rcc)) where role is the role that is created by
the coordinator Web service and access mode is Create and rcc is the role creation
constraint. Role creation constraints are as follows:
• The created role can not have more privilege than the creating role.
• If an object is owned by an agency other than the agency which created the role,
then the role permission assignment for the created role should be speciﬁed by
the coordinator Web service of the agency to which the object belongs.
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Fig. 4. XML schema nodes
Fig. 5. Venn diagram of keys for three roles
3.6 Secure Selective Sharing of Fine-grained Information
Portions of an XML Document are selectively shared (push or pull) at both inter-
agency and intra-agency level according to the predeﬁned policies whose deﬁnitions
are based on a corresponding XML schema. In [2], a solution was proposed where
portions of the document to which the same policies (role in our case) apply are
encrypted with the same key. This solution should result in a limited number of
generated keys for a given document only if there are no overlaps i.e., more than
one role has access to a give element of the XML document. To elaborate, consider
a fragment of an XML schema as depicted in Figure 4,
where a role, R1, may have access right to Node1 and Node2.At the same time
another role, R2, may have access right to Node2 and Node3. If Node1 and Node2
are encrypted with key, K1, and Node2 and Node3 are encrypted with another key,
K2, then Node2 will be encrypted with two diﬀerent keys. If only one of the keys is
delivered to R1 and R2, neither will be able to access Node2. On the other hand, if,
K1 andK2 are delivered then R1 will gain access to Node3 and R2 will gain access
to the Node1 a violation of the access policy in place. To alleviate this problem,
the overlapping node: Node2 in this case, can be encrypted with a third key, K3.
Afterwards,K3, K1 can be distributed to R1 and K3, K2 can be distributed to R2.
Although, this solution seems reasonable, it worst case performance would result
in number of generated and distributed keys to be Minimum(2R-1, N) where R is
the number of roles and N is the number of nodes of the XML document. Figure 5
illustrates the possible overlaps and the number of keys necessary for encryption
when number of roles is equal to three.
To overcome the overlap problem, we encrypt each node of the XML document
with a diﬀerent key. Keys of nodes to which the same role have access rights
are collected in an envelope. Each of the envelopes is encrypted with the public
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Fig. 6. System architecture
key for the corresponding role. Finally, encrypted XML document together with
the corresponding roles envelopes and envelope keys are distributed to all roles
simultaneously. This alternative requires distributing envelope keys as many as
the number of roles. Algorithm 1 shows the detailed steps of the corresponding
algorithm.
Algorithm 1 Step 1: Require:Role Permission Assignment Policy, P=(P1,
P2,...Py)
Where Each Py= (Roley,PermissionSety)
Where Each PermissionSety = (AccessMode(Object)1,... AccessMode(Object)y)
Where AccessMode =[Read]
Step 2: Require:XML Schema
Step 3: For Each Node= 1,2 ...m
Step 4: km ← Generate Key
Step 5: em ← Encrypt nodem with km
Step 6: keytable1 ←(nodem, km)
Step 7: End For
Step 8: For Each Role= 1, 2 ...y
Step 9: For Each nodem in PermissionSety
Step 10: envelopey ← km
Step 11: End For
Step 12: ky ← Generate Key
Step 13: ey ← Encrypt envelopey with ky
Step 14: keytable2 ← (envelopey, ky)
Step 15: Distribute (Encrypted XML Document, envelopey, ky)
Step 16: End For
4 System Architecture
As illustrated in Figure 6, the framework of our system for secure and selective
sharing of XML documents consists of the following main modules: XML Parser,
Encryption Module, Key Generation Module and Distribution Module. Initially,
XML document is parsed into the nodes. Later, each node is encrypted in the
Encryption Module with a diﬀerent key coming from the key generation module.
These generated keys are collected in an envelope for each role according to the
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policies coming from the Policy Base, and then these envelops are encrypted in
Encryption Module by the keys coming from the Key Generation Module. Finally,
encrypted XML document, envelope and corresponding key are disseminated to
corresponding role.
5 Related Work
In [3], Damiani et al. present an access control model for XML documents.In
addition, they present a language for the speciﬁcation of access restrictions together
with a description of system architecture for access control enforcement. However,
their access control model is generic. In [5], Gabillon et al. deﬁne a security model
for regulating access to XML documents. In their model, the authorization rules
related to a speciﬁc XML document are ﬁrst deﬁned on a separate Authorization
sheet. This Authorization sheet is then translated into an XSLT sheet. If a user
requests access to the XML document then the XSLT processor uses the XSLT sheet
to provide the user with a view of the XML document which is compatible with
his rights. Again, their access control model is of generic nature. In [2], Bertino et
al. propose a credential based access control model for XML documents where a
solution was proposed where portions of the document to which the same policies
apply are encrypted with the same key. However, their approach does not take into
consideration the case where there are overlaps i.e., more than one credential has
access to a given element of the XML document. In [6],He et al. proposed arithmetic
so that access control policies can be speciﬁed at the element level. In addition,
they propose self evolving RBXAC model which we make use of in our approach for
the role creation process which is necessary for dynamic composition of VMART. In
[7], Kudo et al. present an XML access control language (XACL) which is based on
provisional authorization which tells the user that his request will be authorized if
he takes certain security actions such as signing his statement prior to authorization
of his request. However this approach does not ﬁt into our environment where the
initiative of sharing information resides with the information owner.In [9], Zhang
et al. proposes RBAC policies should be deﬁned in XML documents before being
mapped to the XML documents of interest.
6 Conclusion & Future Work
In this paper we proposed a two tier RBAC approach for secure and selective in-
formation sharing in a virtual environment which has two levels: 1) Inter-agency;
2) Intra-agency. In such an environment, we assumed that a coordinator Web ser-
vice of each agency is responsible for authentication, information dissemination,
information acquisition, role creation and enforcement of predeﬁned access control
policies. As part of this work we developed information sharing framework which
is based on the encryption of XML documents according to RBAC policies deﬁned
for XML schema. In [8], B. Shaﬁq et al. proposed a policy integration framework
for merging heterogeneous RBAC policies of multiple domains into a global access
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control policy. A key challenge in the composition of their policy is the resolution
of conﬂicts that might arise among the RBAC policies of individual domains. As
part of our future work we intend to extend their approach by merging the access
control policies of collaborating agencies into a global access control policy. This
approach will enable us to directly distribute XML documents to the roles within
agency utilizing this merged global access control policy. Our extended work will
also relax the dissemination responsibility of the coordinator Web services.
Given the dynamic nature of policy speciﬁcation and the related changes, the
evolution of these policies is a challenging issue that forms part of our future work.
Another related issue deals with the description of policies in terms of rights, obli-
gations, dispensations, and prohibitions. We intend to develop a semantic interface
for describing policies in semantic languages that will enhance the associated inter-
operability and extensibility. The semantic description facilitates interpretation and
reasoning over policies, conﬂict resolution and assists security and privacy gover-
nance by means of policy enforcement. A major hurdle in sharing resources between
organizations is heterogeneity on account of semantic diﬀerences. Semantic diﬀer-
ences occur due to diﬀerences in the organizational structure of agencies and the
document generated are another major issue to be addressed. As part of our future
work we are researching ontology mapping and linking techniques and we intend to
explore applying to alleviate these semantic diﬀerences.
Our future work also includes selective distribution of sensitive multimedia infor-
mation as our existing approach deals speciﬁcally with XML documents. However
emergency management information is increasingly including multimedia informa-
tion, e.g., audio, video, satellite images, topographic city maps and streaming media.
In [1], W. J. Adams proposed a decentralized trust-based access control system for
a dynamic collaborative environment by building a privilege management infras-
tructure (PMI) based on trust. His PMI system used past behavior as an indication
of future performance, no a priori user or resource conﬁguration was required. We
plan to explore applying this work to overcome some of the limitation of the PKI
infrastructure.
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